이번 세미나에서는 1부 6장 Market Design을 다룹니다.

Chapter 6. Market Design

아래 요약한 내용을 다시 한 번 읽어 봅니다.

• Market Design and Token Economics
  • Thickness (size of network)
    • Bring all the relevant parties who want to transact together. Make sure to consider the timing of transactions like when should offers be made and how long the transaction period can be left open. For example, voting period or transaction validation period.
      • Mining (Relevance to proof of work [PoW])
        • Incentivise participation in the network through block rewards (e.g. $BTC)
        • More block rewards at first to increase early adopters (i.e. reward their risk-taking action with more block rewards)
      • Partnerships
        • Partner with related companies to drive early adoption and bootstrap network effect (e.g. Ethereum Enterprise Alliance)
        • Tokens to entice network partnership between companies and users (Business 2 Peer)
      • Bonuses
        • Extra token if someone joins the network through referral (Peer 2 Peer)
        • Airdrop
  • Reduced Congestion
    • Ensure that there is sufficient time to consider the options. Otherwise, there are too many offers and no time to consider them (aka congestion). Resolve this issue by having the protocol to help people make better choices. An example is Yearn Finance. It uses onchain data to determine the best returns of interest rates and deposit funds there.
      • Govern Transaction
        • Grade transactions and remove low-quality transactions to ease congestion
        • Meter bandwidth
      • Charge Fees
        • Access fees
        • Congestion fees (like road fees during peak hours)
      • Governing validators
        • Fixed set of validators for consensus (E.g. multi- sig wallet holders)
        • Randomly select groups of nodes for consensus
        • Specifying super-nodes with authority for consensus (E.g. MakerDao)
        • Proof of Authority Notary notes (mainly used within enterprise-level applications)
  • Safety & Ease of Use
    • Make it easy for people to join and safe for them to transact.
      • Resolving asymmetric information
        • Increase transparency for participants (e.g. share more details about counterparties before transacting)
      • Staking
        • Safety deposits that can be activated during a dispute
        • Skin in the game so everyone is less likely to be a bad actor (e.g. Synthetix and staking programs)
      • Privacy features
        • Privacy mechanisms like zero-knowledge proofs (e.g. zCash)
        • Ring signatures (e.g. Monero)
      • Cryptographic agility
        • Post-quantum security (e.g. QRLedger, IOTA, Corda)
        • Compatibility with secure hardware models and better key management
      • Peer-reviewed white papers
        • Fundamental algorithmic issues (e.g. algorithms and code that produce skewed results, creating non-random outcomes, collisions and forgery)
  • Additional consideration: Repugnance
    • Sometimes, repugnance trades can be resolved with efficient market design. Repugnance refers to the social constraints preventing exchange from taking place at positive prices.
      • In general, these markets exist because the use of money in these trades can be considered a taboo. These transactions are also generally outside of the usual market transactions like buying eggs and milk. Sometimes, these trades can be considered immoral.
      • Example of repugnant markets: Adoption of children, Surrogacy, Sexuality, Military service, Voting buying, Pollution, Organ transplant, Friendship, Admission to schools, Nobel prize, Genes and living tissues
    • Thus, market design becomes crucial in the economics design of these systems.
      • For example, BitTorrent. Uploaders seed the data while downloaders download the information. These transactions do not use money to trade, since the philosophies of the uploaders and downloaders do not always appreciate the use of money in trade. Instead, there can be new ways to manage the uploaders and downloaders to prevent free riding.